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Abstract
The paper studies the model of multilateral bargaining over the alternatives rep-
resented by points in the m–dimensional Euclidean space. Proposers are chosen
randomly and the acceptance of a proposal requires the unanimous approval of it by
all the players. The focus of the paper is on the asymptotic behavior of subgame
perfect equilibria in pure stationary strategies (called bargaining equilibria) as the
breakdown probability tends to zero. Bargaining equilibria are said to be asymp-
totically unique if the limit of a sequence of bargaining equilibria as the breakdown
probability tends to zero is independent of the choice of the sequence and is uniquely
determined by the primitives of the model. We show that the limit of any sequence
of bargaining equilibria is a zero point of the so–called linearization correspondence.
The asymptotic uniqueness of bargaining equilibria is then deduced in each of the
following cases: (1) m = n− 1, where n is the number of players, (2) m = 1, and (3)
in the case where the utility functions are quadratic, for each 1 ≤ m ≤ n−1. In each
case the linearization correspondence is shown to have a unique zero. Result 1 has
been established earlier in Miyakawa [13] and Laruelle and Valenciano [3]. Result 2
is subsumed by the result in Predtetchinski [14]. Result 3 is new.
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1 The model
This paper studies strategic bargaining as in the model of Banks and Duggan [1]. The
alternatives are represented by the points in the Euclidean space. At the beginning of
each period of time a random draw determines whether bargaining continues or the game
terminates. If the game terminates, the players receive their disagreement payoﬀs. If
bargaining continues, a player is randomly chosen to make a proposal. The chosen player
proposes one alternative, and the players vote on the proposal. Each player can either reject
or accept the proposal. Voting proceeds sequentially, with the sequence of responses being
ﬁxed throughout the game. If the proposal is unanimously accepted it is implemented and
the game ends. Otherwise, the next period begins. The recognition and the breakdown
probabilities are exogenously given.
The focus of the paper is on the asymptotic uniqueness of subgame perfect equilibria
in pure stationary strategies which we call bargaining equilibria. Consider a sequence
of bargaining equilibria as the breakdown probability tends to zero. If the equilibrium
proposal of some player i converges to the alternative x, so does the equilibrium proposal
of any other player j. If the point x is uniquely determined by the primitives and is
independent of the choice of the sequence of bargaining equilibria, we say that the equilibria
are asymptotically unique. Asymptotic uniqueness of equilibria is a very attractive property
of a bargaining model. Even though it does not guarantee the uniqueness of equilibria for
any given breakdown probability, it does imply that the multiplicity of equilibria becomes
insigniﬁcant as the breakdown probability becomes small.
The asymptotic uniqueness of equilibria has been so far shown (a) for the one–
dimensional model of bargaining and (b) for the games where the set of eﬃcient util-
ity payoﬀs is a (n−1)–dimensional set, where n denotes the number of players. We discuss
the respective contributions in turn.
The one–dimensional model of bargaining is a game where the space of alternatives is
a subset of the real line. Suﬃcient condition for the (asymptotic) uniqueness of bargaining
equilibria in such models have been given in Cho and Duggan [5], Cardona and Ponsat´ı [4],
Herings and Predtetchinski [8] and in Predtetchinski [14]. The asymptotic uniqueness of
equilibria in the one–dimensional model has been shown under very mild assumptions on
the primitives. In particular, Cardona and Ponsat´ı [4] establish the asymptotic uniqueness
in a version of the model where the proposer is chosen according to some deterministically
rotating scheme, while Predtetchinski [14] studies a game with time–invariant recognition
probabilities (as in this paper). In either case, all that is required of the utility functions
is concavity and single–peakedness. More restrictive assumptions have to be invoked to
obtain the uniqueness of equilibria in a ﬁxed game (see [4, 5, 8]). The examples of one–
dimensional games of bargaining with multiple equilibria are given in Cho and Duggan [5]
and in Kalandrakis [9].
We now turn to the second group of contributions: Miyakawa [13], Laruelle and Valen-
ciano [3], Eraslan [6], Kultti and Vartiainen [10]. These are works where the set of eﬃcient
payoﬀ vectors is assumed to be of dimension n−1, where n is the number of players. Since
n − 1 is the highest dimension the eﬃcient payoﬀ vectors can have, we call such games
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full–dimensional. An important example of a full–dimensional game is the divide–the–
dollar game where the player’s utility is assumed to depend only on the amount of money
allocated to that player.
Miyakawa [13] and Laruelle and Valenciano [3] show that under the assumption of
full–dimensionality as the breakdown probability tends to zero the bargaining equilibria
converge to the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. This is the point that maximizes
the geometric weighted mean of the payoﬀs with the weights equal to the respective recog-
nition probabilities. These ﬁndings generalize an earlier result of Binmore et al [2] for the
two–player case. A related result is given in Kultti and Vartiainen [10] who obtain the
asymmetric Nash bargaining solution as a limit of the Von Neumann–Morgenstern stable
set as the discount factor vanishes. The stable set is deﬁned with respect to a dominance
relation where an alternative x dominates an alternative y if some player prefers x over y
even with a one–period delay. Eraslan [6] establishes the uniqueness of equilibria in the
divide–the–dollar game under the assumption that the utility functions are linear.
Also related is the work of Kalandrakis [9] where local uniqueness of stationary equilibria
has been shown for the model in Banks and Duggan [1] in its full generality. Merlo and
Wilson [11, 12], and Eraslan and Merlo [7] study a more general model of bargaining where
the set of feasible agreements changes stochastically over time.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. We provide a uniﬁed approach to the problem
of asymptotic uniqueness of bargaining equilibria in the model of Banks and Duggan [1] and
deduce the asymptotic uniqueness in the one–dimensional and in the full–dimensional cases
from our general result. We also identify a class of games where bargaining equilibria are
asymptotically unique irrespectively of the dimension of the set of alternatives or eﬃcient
payoﬀ vectors.
In more detail our results are as follows. We show that the limit of any sequence of bar-
gaining equilibria is a zero point of the so–called linearization correspondence. Asymptotic
uniqueness of equilibria is then established in each of the following cases: (1) m = n− 1,
where m is the dimensionality of the set of alternatives, (2) m = 1, and (3) the case where
the utility functions are quadratic, for each 1 ≤ m ≤ n − 1. In each case the asymptotic
uniqueness of equilibria is proven by showing that the linearization correspondence has a
unique zero.
Result 1 for the full–dimensional case is the same as in Miyakawa [13] and Laruelle
and Valenciano [3] with the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution being the unique limit
of bargaining equilibria. Result 2 on the one–dimensional model is somewhat weaker than
in Predtetchinski [14] due to the fact that we restrict our attention to the unanimity
acceptance rule. It is complementary to the asymptotic uniqueness result in Cardona and
Ponsat´ı [4] who consider a game where the proposer is determined by a ﬁxed rotation rule.
Result 3 for the quadratic utility functions is new. To the best of my knowledge, it is the
only result on the asymptotic uniqueness of bargaining equilibria outside the extreme cases
m = 1 and m = n− 1.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the game of bargaining is
presented and the assumptions on the primitives are discussed. In Section 3 it is shown
that the diﬀerence between the equilibrium proposals of any two players tends to zero
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as the breakdown probability becomes negligible. In Section 4 the equilibrium conditions
are linearized to obtain the so–called linearization correspondence. It is shown that the
limit of any sequence of bargaining equilibria is a zero of the linearization correspondence.
Sections 5, 6 and 7 establish the uniqueness of the limit of bargaining equilibria in the
one–dimensional case, the full–dimensional case, and the case with quadratic utilities,
respectively.
2 The model
Consider a situation where the players have to agree on a choice of a point from the m–
dimensional Euclidean space Rm. The points of Rm will be referred to as alternatives. The
set of players will be denoted by N , with n being the number of players. The utility of
an alternative x to player i is ui(x). There is a probability distribution μ on the set N .
The probability μi is the probability for player i to be chosen as a proposer and is called
the recognition probability of player i. The model is speciﬁed by the choice of m, the
dimension of the set of alternatives, the set of players N , the recognition probabilities μ
and the utility functions ui for i in N .
We now discuss our assumptions on the utility functions.
(A1) The function ui is concave and continuously diﬀerentiable.
(A2) The set X = {x ∈ Rm | ui(x) ≥ 0} is compact and it contains the alternative x such
that ui(x) > 0 for each i ∈ N .
Now the alternative x ∈ Rm is said to be weakly Pareto eﬃcient if there is no other
alternative x¯ such that ui(x¯) > ui(x) for each i ∈ N . The alternative x is said to be Pareto
eﬃcient if there is no other point x¯ such that ui(x¯) ≥ ui(x) for each i ∈ N and uk(x¯) > uk(x)
for some k ∈ N . We write dui(x) to denote the vector of partial derivatives of ui at the
point x. The inner product of the vectors z and x is denoted by 〈x, z〉 = x1z1 + · · ·+xmzm.
(A3) Each weakly Pareto–eﬃcient alternative is Pareto eﬃcient.
(A4) If x is a Pareto–eﬃcient alternative and z a vector such that 〈dui(x), z〉 = 0 for each
i ∈ N , then z = 0.
Assumption (A3) is satisﬁed if all utility functions are strictly concave. Assumption
(A4) guarantees that there is a one–to–one relationship between the eﬃcient alternatives
and payoﬀs: no two distinct Pareto–eﬃcient alternatives give the same payoﬀ to every
player. In this sense, no alternative is “redundant”.
Given a continuation probability δ ∈ [0, 1) we deﬁne the game of bargaining Γ(δ)
as follows. The game starts in period zero. At the beginning of each period a random
draw determines whether bargaining continues of the game terminates, in which case each
player receives the disagreement payoﬀ of zero. The probability that bargaining continues
is δ. If bargaining does continue, a player is randomly drawn from the set N to make a
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proposal. Player i is chosen with probability μi. The chosen player proposes an alternative
x from Rm. All players (including the proposer) respond sequentially, with the sequence of
responses being ﬁxed throughout the game. Each responder can either accept or reject the
current proposal. If all players accept the proposal, the game terminates and the proposal
x is implemented, with player i receiving the payoﬀ of ui(x). Otherwise, the next period
begins.
The game tree of Γ(δ) is similar to that in Banks and Duggan [1] with the diﬀerence
that in Γ(δ) the players vote sequentially, while in [1] the votes are cast simultaneously.
We insist that players vote sequentially to rule out coordination problems in the response
stage of the game, for example a situation when any alternative is unanimously rejected
independently of preferences. Furthermore, we focus on the unanimity acceptance rule to
make sure that subgame perfect equilibria in pure stationary exist (see Theorem 2 in Banks
and Duggan [1]).
We shall restrict our attention to pure stationary strategies by which we mean the
strategies such that (a) a proposal of any player is independent of the history of play and
(b) the reaction of a player to a proposal only depends on the proposal itself. Thus a
stationary strategy of player i consists of a proposal xi and an acceptance set Ai. Player i
proposes the point xi whenever player i is chosen to be a proposer and he accepts a proposal
x if and only if x is an element of the set Ai. A joint stationary strategy σ = (x•, A•)
induces the social acceptance set A = ∩Ai. A proposal x is implemented if and only if it
is an element of the social acceptance set A.
Consider the case where the proposal xi of each player i lies in the social acceptance
set A. In this case each proposal is accepted without delay. The expected utility yi of
player i can then be computed as a weighted sum of ui(xk), where the weights equal to
the respective recognition probabilities. Player i’s continuation payoﬀ when a proposal
is turned down is given by δyi. Therefore, player i accepts a proposal x if and only if
ui(x) ≥ δyi. Since all proposals in the set A pass, player i proposes a point xi that
maximizes i’s utility on A. These considerations motivate the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 1 A joint stationary strategy σ = (x•, A•) is a bargaining equilibrium of the
game Γ(δ) if
xi = argmax
x∈A
ui(x) for each i ∈ N,
yi =
∑
k∈N
μkui(xk) for each i ∈ N, where
Ai = {x ∈ X|ui(x) ≥ δyi} for each i ∈ N,
A = ∩Ai.
One can show that a bargaining equilibrium thus deﬁned is a subgame perfect equi-
librium of the game Γ(δ). Conversely, given a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game
Γ(δ) in pure stationary strategies there exists a bargaining equilibrium with the same equi-
librium proposals and the same expected payoﬀs. Under the maintained assumptions the
existence of bargaining equilibrium follows from Theorem 2 in Banks and Duggan [1].
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3 The limit of bargaining equilibria
In this section we establish that as the continuation probability δ tends to one, the distance
between the equilibrium proposals of any two players converges to zero. Thus if the proposal
of player i converges to the point x as δ tends to one, so does the proposal of any other
player j. Any such point x is called the limit of a sequence of bargaining equilibria.
Let
S = {i ∈ N | μi > 0} and ν = min
i∈S
{μi}.
Proposition 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 are the auxiliary results we need for the proof of Theorem 1.
Proposition 3.1 Let (x•, A•) be a bargaining equilibrium of the game Γ(δ) inducing the
expected payoﬀs y• and the social acceptance set A. Then A ⊂ X.
Proof. Each point xi is an element of the set A, so ui(xk) ≥ δyi for each k ∈ N . Fur-
thermore, yi =
∑
k∈N μkui(xk). It follows that yi ≥ δyi or equivalently, (1 − δ)yi ≥ 0.
Since δ ∈ [0, 1), we have yi ≥ 0. The result follows since for a point x of A we have
ui(x) ≥ δyi ≥ 0.
Since X is assumed to be a compact set by (A2), there exists a real number c such
that ui(x) ≤ c for each x ∈ X.
Proposition 3.2 Let (x•, A•) be a bargaining equilibrium of the game Γ(δ) inducing the
expected payoﬀs y• and the social acceptance set A. Then |uk(xi) − uk(xj)| ≤ (1 − δ)c/ν
for each k ∈ N and each (i, j) ∈ S × S.
Proof. Fix a player k ∈ N . The proposal xi of any player i is in the social acceptance set
A which is contained in the set X by Proposition 3.1. Therefore, uk(xi) ≤ c for each i ∈ N
and yk ≤ c for each k ∈ N . Furthermore, uk(xi) ≥ δyk. For each i ∈ S there is a chain of
inequalities:
yk =
∑
l∈S μluk(xl)
≥ μiuk(xi) + (1− μi)δyk
= δyk + μi(uk(xi)− δyk)
≥ δyk + ν(uk(xi)− δyk)
= νuk(xi) + (1− ν)δyk.
We conclude that
δyk ≤ uk(xi) ≤ (1− δ + νδ)yk/ν for each i ∈ S.
Therefore, for each (i, j) ∈ S × S we have
|uk(xi)− uk(xj)| ≤ (1− δ + νδ)yk/ν − δyk = (1− δ)yk/ν ≤ (1− δ)c/ν.
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We now show that there is a one–to–one relation between the Pareto–eﬃcient alternatives
and the payoﬀs: no pair of distinct Pareto–eﬃcient alternatives give the same payoﬀ to
every player.
Proposition 3.3 Let x and x¯ be Pareto–eﬃcient alternatives. If ui(x) = ui(x¯) for each
i ∈ N , then x = x¯.
Proof. Let xt = (1 − t)x + tx¯ for t ∈ [0, 1]. By the concavity of the utility function
ui(x
t) ≥ ui(x) for each i ∈ N . Since x is a Pareto–eﬃcient alternative, we must have
ui(x
t) = ui(x) for each i ∈ N . But then 0 = limt↓0[ui(xt) − ui(x)]/t = 〈dui(x), x¯− x〉 for
each i ∈ N . By Assumption (A4), we must have x¯− x = 0.
We are now in a position to state the main result of the section.
Theorem 1 For each natural r let (xr•, A
r
•) be a bargaining equilibrium of the game Γ(δ
r)
inducing the continuation payoﬀs yr• and the social acceptance set A
r. If δr −→ 1 then
‖xr − x¯r‖ −→ 0 for each sequence (xr, x¯r) ∈ Ar × Ar. Furthermore, if xr −→ x, then x is
a Pareto–eﬃcient alternative.
Proof. By Proposition 3.1 the sequence {xri} is entirely contained in the set X which is
compact by Assumption (A2). We can therefore assume without loss of generality that
for every i ∈ S the sequence {xri} is converging, say to a point xi. We ﬁrst show that the
points xi for i ∈ S are the same.
By the continuity of the utility functions uk(x
r
i ) −→ uk(xi). By Proposition 3.2
|uk(xri ) − uk(xrj)| < (1 − δr)c/ν for each pair (i, j) ∈ S × S and each k ∈ N . It fol-
lows that uk(xi) = uk(xj) for each (i, j) ∈ S × S and each k ∈ N . It follows that
yrk =
∑
l∈S μluk(x
r
l ) −→ uk(xi) for each i ∈ S and k ∈ N .
The alternative xi for each i ∈ S is weakly Pareto–eﬃcient. Suppose not. Then there
exists an alternative x˙ such that uk(x˙) > uk(xi) for each k ∈ N . But then for n large
enough uk(x˙) > uk(x
r
i ) for each k ∈ N . Since uk(xri ) ≥ δryrk, the point x˙ is in the set Ar,
which contradicts the fact that the equilibrium proposal xri of player i maximizes player
i’s utility on Ar. Thus xi is weakly Pareto–eﬃcient for each i ∈ S. By Assumption (A3)
it is also Pareto–eﬃcient. Thus the alternatives xi are Pareto–eﬃcient and give the same
utility to each player. It follows from Proposition 3.3 that the point xi is the same for each
i ∈ S. Let xi = x¯ for each i ∈ S.
We now show that xr −→ x¯ for each sequence xr ∈ Ar. Without loss of generality
assume that xr −→ x. Since uk(xr) ≥ δryrk for each n, in the limit uk(x) ≥ uk(x¯) for
each k ∈ N . Since the alterative x¯ has been shown to be Pareto–eﬃcient, we must have
uk(x) = uk(x¯) for each k ∈ N . It follows from Proposition 3.3 that x = x¯, as desired.
Deﬁnition 2 A point x as in Theorem 1 is called the limit of a sequence of bargaining
equilibria. Bargaining equilibria are said to be asymptotically unique if the limit of a
sequence of bargaining equilibria is unique.
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4 The linearization correspondence
Consider a limit x of a sequence of bargaining equilibria. The key insight into the nature of
the point x comes from the analysis of the limits of the sequence [xi−E(x•)]/(1−δ), where
E(x•) denotes the expected equilibrium proposal. We are able to characterize these limits
as a function of x. Loosely speaking, this exercise amounts to linearizing the conditions of
Deﬁnition 1 around the point δ = 1. The condition that the sum of these limits weighted
with the recognition probabilities be equal to zero translates into the condition that the
point x be a zero of the linearization correspondence.
We already know that as the breakdown probability tends to zero, the distance between
the equilibrium proposals of any two players converges to zero. Proposition 4.1 below adds
to this result that the speed of convergence is at least 1− δ. In other words, the diﬀerence
of xi and xj tends to zero rapidly enough for the ratio (xi−xj)/(1−δ) to remain bounded.
Proposition 4.1 For each n let (xr•, A
r
•) be a bargaining equilibrium of the game Γ(δ
r)
inducing the continuation payoﬀs yr• and the social acceptance set A
r. Suppose that δr −→ 1
and xr −→ x for xr ∈ Ar. Let
drij = [x
r
i − xrj ]/(1− δr).
Then for each (i, j) ∈ S × S the sequence {drij} is bounded.
Proof. Suppose not. Replacing, if necessary, the sequence by a subsequence, we can
assume that ‖dr‖ converges to inﬁnity. (As i and j are ﬁxed we omit the subscript ij). By
the concavity of the function uk there are the inequalities
〈duk(xri ), xri − xrj〉 ≤ uk(xri )− uk(xrj) ≤ 〈duk(xrj), xri − xrj〉.
Dividing by (1− δr)‖dr‖ yields the inequalities
〈duk(xri ), dr〉
‖dr‖ ≤
1
‖dr‖
[uk(x
r
i )− uk(xrj)]
1− δr ≤
〈duk(xrj), dr〉
‖dr‖ .
By Proposition 3.2 |uk(xri ) − uk(xrj)|/(1 − δr) ≤ c/ν for each k. By the supposition
1/‖dr‖ −→ 0. By the continuity of the map dui we have duk(xri ) −→ duk(x) and
duk(x
r
j) −→ duk(x). The sequence dr/‖dr‖ lies in the unit sphere, and therefore has a
convergent subsequence. Again replacing the sequence by a subsequence we can assume
that dr/‖dr‖ converges to a non–zero vector z. Then taking the limit in the above inequal-
ity as n goes to inﬁnity, we obtain 〈duk(x), z〉 = 0. Since k is an arbitrary element of N ,
we arrive at a contradiction with Assumption (A4).
Notice that Proposition 4.1 refers only to the players with positive probabilities of
recognition. Indeed, the sequence (xri − xrj)/(1− δr) need not be bounded if either players
i or j have zero recognition probability. We illustrate this point by an example.
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Let X = [0, 1] and N = {0, 1}. The utility functions are u0(x) = 1 − x and u1(x) =
1 − (1 − x)2. Thus 0 is player 0’s ideal point while 1 is the ideal point of player 1.
Suppose now the recognition probability of player 0 is 0. It is easy to see that the interval
A = [1 − √1− δ, 1] is the social acceptance set in a bargaining equilibrium of Γ(δ). In
this equilibrium player 0 proposes the left endpoint of A and player 1 proposes the right
endpoint. The expected utility for player 0 is 0 and for player 1 is 1. We see that (x1 −
x0)/(1− δ) = 1/
√
1− δ goes to inﬁnity as δ goes to one.
Proposition 4.2 Consider the functions hri , hi : R
m → R for each i ∈ N and each natural
r. Deﬁne the sets Cr = ∩{x ∈ Rm | hri (x) ≥ 0} and C = ∩{x ∈ Rm | hi(x) ≥ 0}, where
the intersection is taken over all i in N . Suppose that hri (x
r) −→ hi(x) whenever xr −→ x.
Suppose also that the function hi is concave and that there exists an x¯ such that hi(x¯) > 0
for each i. Then (a) if xr ∈ Cr and xr −→ x, then x ∈ C and conversely (b) given a point
x ∈ C there exists a sequence xr ∈ Cr such that xr −→ x.
Proof. Part (a) is obvious. We prove (b). Consider ﬁrst any point x such that hi(x) > 0
for each i ∈ N . Then x ∈ Cr for r large enough. For if not, there would exist an i such
that hrki (x) < 0 for all k implying that hi(x) ≤ 0, a contradiction.
Now let x be an arbitrary point of C. The sequence of points xq = (x¯ + (q − 1)x)/q
converges to the point x and h(xq) > 0 for each q. By the previous paragraph, each point
xq is contained in the set Cr for r large. That is, for each q there exists a number m(q) such
that xq ∈ Cr whenever r ≥ m(q). Without loss of generality assume that m is increasing
and deﬁne the sequence {x¯r} by letting x¯r = xq if m(q) ≤ r < m(q +1). Then xr ∈ Cr for
each r and xr −→ x.
For each x ∈ X deﬁne
Z(x) =
⋂
i∈N
{z ∈ Rm | 〈dui(x), z〉+ ui(x) ≥ 0}.
Proposition 4.3 For each r let (xr•, A
r
•) be a bargaining equilibrium of the game Γ(δ
r)
inducing the continuation payoﬀs yr• and the social acceptance set A
r. Suppose that δr −→ 1
and xr −→ x for xr ∈ Ar. Let
Zr = [Ar −E(xr•)]/(1− δr), where E(xr•) =
∑
i∈S μix
r
i
Then (a) if zr ∈ Zr and zr −→ z, then z ∈ Z(x) and conversely (b) given a point z ∈ Z(x)
there exists a sequence zr ∈ Zr such that zr −→ z.
Proof. We apply Proposition 4.2. Notice that Zr = ∩{z ∈ Rm | hri (z) ≥ 0} and
Z = ∩{z ∈ Rm | hi(z) ≥ 0}, where the functions hri , hi : Rm −→ R are given by the
equations
hri (z) =
ui(E(x
r
•) + (1− δr)z)− δryr
1− δr and hi(z) = 〈dui(x), z〉 + ui(x).
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The function hi is obviously concave. Furthermore, take a point x¯ such that ui(x¯) > 0 for
each i ∈ N (the existence of such a point is guaranteed by Assumption (A2)). Then by the
concavity of the utility functions we have 0 < ui(x¯) ≤ ui(x) + 〈dui(x), x¯− x〉 = hi(x¯− x)
for each i. It remains to verify that hri (z
r) −→ hi(z) whenever zr −→ z.
Write
xr = E(xr•) + (1− δr)zr and
hri (z
r) =
ui(x
r)− δryri
1− δr =
ui(x
r)− yri
1− δr + y
r
i .
Since yri −→ ui(x) we only have to show that [ui(xr) − yri ]/(1 − δr) −→ 〈dui(x), z〉. To
do so we give an upper and a lower bound on [ui(x
r) − yri ]/(1 − δr) and show that both
converge to 〈dui(x), z〉.
For each k ∈ N we have the inequalities
ui(x
r)− ui(xrk) ≥ 〈dui(xr), xr − xrk〉.
Taking the expected value of both sides of the inequality with respect to k and dividing
by 1− δr yields
ui(x
r)− yri
1− δr ≥
〈dui(xr), xr − E(xr•)〉
1− δr = 〈dui(x
r), zr〉 −→ 〈dui(x), z〉.
Let drij be as in Proposition 4.1. Since the sequence is bounded for each (i, j) ∈ S × S
we can assume without loss of generality that it converges to the point dij. Notice that∑
i∈S
∑
j∈S
μiμjd
r
ij = 0, therefore
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈S
μiμjdij = 0.
Now for each k ∈ N we have the inequality
ui(x
r)− ui(xrk) ≤ 〈dui(xrk), xr − xrk〉
= 〈dui(xrk), xr − E(xr•)〉 − 〈dui(xrk), xrk − E(x•)〉
= 〈dui(xrk), xr − E(xr•)〉 −
∑
j∈S
μj〈dui(xrk), xrk − xrj〉.
Taking the expected value with respect to k we get
ui(x
r)− yi ≤
∑
k∈S
μk〈dui(xrk), xr − E(xr•)〉 −
∑
k∈S
∑
j∈S
μkμj〈dui(xrk), xrk − xrj〉.
Dividing by 1− δr and taking the limit we get
ui(x
r)− yi
1− δr ≤
∑
k∈N
μk〈dui(xrk), zr〉 −
∑
k∈S
∑
j∈S
μkμj〈dui(xrk), drkj〉
−→ 〈dui(x), z〉 −
∑
k∈S
∑
j∈S
μkμj〈dui(x), dkj〉
= 〈dui(x), z〉 − 〈dui(x),
∑
k∈S
∑
j∈S
μkμjdkj〉
= 〈dui(x), z〉.
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This completes the proof.
Deﬁne the correspondences ϕi : R
m
⇒ R
m by the equations
ϕi(x) = arg max
z∈Z(x)
〈dui(x), z〉 for each i ∈ S.
When the set Z(x) is not bounded, the function z → 〈dui(x), z〉 may attain no maximum
on Z(x), in which case the set ϕi(x) is empty. For future reference we state the following
observation.
Proposition 4.4 Let z ∈ ϕi(x). Then 〈dui(x), z〉+ ui(x) > 0.
Proof. Take a point x¯ such that uk(x¯) > 0 for each k ∈ N (the existence of such a point is
guaranteed by Assumption (A2)). Then by the concavity of the utility functions we have
0 < uk(x¯) ≤ uk(x)+ 〈duk(x), x¯− x〉 for each k. Then the point x¯−x is an element of Z(x)
and the result follows.
Proposition 4.5 For each r let (xr•, A
r
•) be a bargaining equilibrium of the game Γ(δ
r)
inducing the continuation payoﬀs yr• and the social acceptance set A
r. Suppose that δr −→ 1
and xr −→ x for xr ∈ Ar. Let
zri = [x
r
i − E(xr•)]/(1− δr).
If zri −→ zi then zi ∈ ϕi(x).
Proof. Let the set Zr be as in Proposition 4.3. It is clear that zri ∈ Zr for each n and
consequently zi ∈ Z(x). Now suppose that zi is not an element of ϕi(x). Then there exists
a point z′ in Z(x) such that 〈dui(x), zi〉 < 〈dui(x), z′〉. By Proposition 4.3 there exists a se-
quence of points zr converging to z such that zr ∈ Zr for each n. Let xr be a point of Ar such
that zr = [xr −E(x•)]/(1− δr). For n large enough we have the inequality 〈dui(xr), zri 〉 <
〈dui(xr), zr〉. Rearranging this we obtain 〈dui(xr), xri 〉 < 〈dui(xr), xr〉. Finally, the concav-
ity of the function ui gives the inequality ui(x
r
i ) − ui(xr) ≤ 〈dui(xr), xri − xr〉 < 0, which
contradicts the fact that xri maximizes the function ui on the set A
r.
Deﬁne the correspondence ϕ : Rm ⇒ Rm by the equation
ϕ(x) =
{∑
i∈S μiϕi(x) if ϕi(x) =  for each i ∈ S
 otherwise.
We shall refer to ϕ as the linearization correspondence. We are now in a position to state
the main result of the section.
Theorem 2 If x is a limit of a sequence of bargaining equilibria then 0 ∈ ϕ(x).
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Proof. There exists a sequence of bargaining equilibria (xr•, A
r
•) of the game Γ(δ
r) inducing
the social acceptance set Ar such that xr −→ x for each sequence of points xr ∈ Ar. Let
drij be as in Proposition 4.1 and z
r
i be as in Proposition 4.5. We know that for each pair
(i, j) ∈ S × S the sequence {drij} is bounded. It follows that for each i ∈ S the sequence
{zri } is bounded, for we can write zri =
∑
j∈S μjd
r
ij. Therefore, replacing the sequences by
subsequences, we can assume that zri −→ zi for each i ∈ S. Since
∑
i∈S μiz
r
i = 0 each n,
in the limit
∑
i∈S μizi = 0. And since zi is an element of ϕi(x) by Proposition 4.5, zero is
an element of ϕ(x).
5 The one–dimensional space of alternatives
In this section we establish the asymptotic uniqueness of bargaining equilibria in the case
m = 1. This result is subsumed by the asymptotic uniqueness result in a companion paper
by Predtetchinski [14] which only deals with the one–dimensional model. In the companion
paper the acceptance or a rejection of a proposal is determined by a general acceptance
rule represented by the collection of decisive coalitions. Cardona and Ponsat´ı [4] establish
the asymptotic uniqueness of bargaining equilibria in the one–dimensional model where the
proposer is chosen according to some deterministic rule, while Herings and Predtetchinski
[8] consider a game where the identity of the proposer follows a Markov process.
We continue to maintain Assumptions (A1) through (A4). In particular Assumption
(A4) requires that there be no point at which the derivatives of all utility functions vanish.
We supplement our Assumptions (A1)–(A4) by the additional condition which requires
that the derivative of each utility function vanishes at one point at most. In other words
each player must have only one bliss point or none at all. We shall write u′i(x) rather than
dui(x) to denote the derivative of the function ui at x.
(A5) For each i there is at most one point x in R such that u′i(x) = 0.
Theorem 3 Suppose m = 1. Assume (A1)–(A5). Then the correspondence ϕ has a
unique zero. Consequently, bargaining equilibria are asymptotically unique.
We prove Theorem 3 by showing that the linearization correspondence ϕ is a decreasing
correspondence. We say that a correspondence γ : R⇒ R is decreasing if y > y¯ whenever
y ∈ γ(x), y¯ ∈ γ(x¯) and x < x¯. It is immediate that a decreasing correspondence has at
most one zero point.
Given a point x ∈ Rm deﬁne the (possibly empty) sets
N−(x) = {i ∈ N | u′i(x) < 0}
No(x) = {i ∈ N | u′i(x) = 0}
N+(x) = {i ∈ N | u′i(x) > 0}.
Assumption (A4) tells us that there is no point x where the derivatives of all the functions
ui vanish. Therefore, for each x either the set N−(x) or the set N+(x) is non–empty. The
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set Z(x) is given by
Z(x) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
[ϕ−(x),+∞) if N−(x) =  and N+(x) = 
[ϕ−(x), ϕ+(x)] if N−(x) =  and N+(x) = 
(−∞, ϕ+(x)] if N−(x) =  and N+(x) = ,
where
ϕ−(x) = − min
i∈N+(x)
{ui(x)/u′i(x)} and ϕ+(x) = − max
i∈N
−
(x)
{ui(x)/u′i(x)}.
For each player i in the set N−(x) the maximization of the function z → u′i(x)z on the set
Z(x) is equivalent to the minimization of z and yields the lower endpoint of Z(x). For a
player i in N+(x) the maximization of z → u′i(x)z is equivalent to the maximization of z
and yields the upper endpoint of Z(x). Thus
ϕi(x) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
 if i ∈ N+(x) and N−(x) = 
{ϕ+(x)} if i ∈ N+(x) and N−(x) = 
Z(x) if i ∈ No(x)
{ϕ−(x)} if i ∈ N−(x) and N+(x) = 
 if i ∈ N−(x) and N+(x) = .
Proposition 5.1 The correspondences ϕi for each i ∈ N and the correspondence ϕ are
decreasing correspondences.
Proof. First we show that the function ϕ− is a decreasing function. Let x < x¯ and suppose
that N+(x) =  and N+(x¯) = . Then we have the inequalities
−ϕ−(x) = mini∈N+(x){ui(x)/u′i(x)}
≤ mini∈N+(x¯){ui(x)/u′i(x)}
< mini∈N+(x¯){ui(x¯)/u′i(x¯)} = −ϕ−(x¯).
The ﬁrst inequality is true because N+(x) ⊃ N+(x¯). To see that the second inequality is
true take an i ∈ N+(x¯). Then u′i(x¯) > 0. Therefore, ui(x) < ui(x¯) and u′i(x) ≥ u′i(x¯). It
follows that ui(x)/u
′
i(x) < ui(x¯)/u
′
i(x¯).
We conclude that ϕ−(x) > ϕ−(x¯). Similarly, one proves that ϕ+ is a decreasing function.
Now we show that each ϕi is a decreasing correspondence. Let x < x¯, z ∈ ϕi(x) and
z¯ ∈ ϕi(x¯). Since ui is a concave function, u′i(x) ≥ u′i(x¯). Since by Assumption (A5) the
derivative of each function ui becomes zero at one point at most, either (a) u
′
i(x) > 0 or
(b) u′i(x¯) < 0. In case (a) we have z = ϕ+(x) > ϕ+(x¯) ≥ z¯. And in case (b) we have
z ≥ ϕ−(x) > ϕ−(x¯) = z¯.
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6 The asymmetric Nash bargaining solution
In this section we show that if m = n − 1 then every sequence of bargaining equilibria
converges to the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. This result is equivalent to that in
Laruelle and Valenciano [3] and in Miyakawa [13]. In [3] and [13] the players propose the
utility payoﬀs directly rather than the alternatives as in the game Γ(δ), but this diﬀerence
is inessential. Indeed, one can see that if m = n− 1 then the set of eﬃcient utility payoﬀs
in the game Γ(δ) satisﬁes all assumptions of Miyakawa [13].
Deﬁnition 3 The asymmetric Nash product is a function ρ : X → R deﬁned by ρ(x) =
×i∈S(ui(x))μi . The point x of X is the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution if it maximizes
the function ρ on the set X.
Theorem 4 Suppose m = n − 1. Assume (A1)–(A4). Suppose moreover that μi > 0
for each i ∈ N . Then the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution is the unique zero of the
correspondence ϕ. Consequently, the limit of every sequence of bargaining equilibria is the
asymmetric Nash bargaining solution.
To derive the ﬁrst order conditions for the maximization of the asymmetric Nash prod-
uct ρ, observe that one can maximize instead the logarithm of the function ρ on the set of
alternatives x such that ui(x) > 0 for each i ∈ N , this set being non–empty by (A2). The
point x is the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution if and only if
ui(x) > 0 for each i ∈ N and
∑
i∈N
μidui(x)/ui(x) = 0. (1)
Let du(x) denote the (n × m)–matrix with row i given by dui(x). Let T (x) be the
image of du(x). That is T (x) is a linear subspace of Rn consisting of the points of the form
du(x)z for z ∈ Rm. By Assumption (A4) the matrix du(x) has rank m and consequently
T (x) is of dimension m. Since m = n− 1, the orthogonal complement T⊥(x) to T (x) is a
one–dimensional space. For each x ﬁx some non–zero vector (x) in T⊥(x) . We shall take
(x) to be a non–negative vector whenever such a vector is an element of T⊥(x). Thus we
can write
T (x) = {t ∈ Rn | 〈(x), t〉 = 0}.
The ﬁrst order conditions for the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution can now be
restated in terms of the vector (x) as follows. Notice that by Equation (1) the vector
(μi/ui(x))i∈N is in the orthogonal complement to the space T (x), and hence proportional
to (x). Therefore, the point x is the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution if and only if
i(x) > 0 and i(x)ui(x) = bμi for all i ∈ N for some b > 0. (2)
Proposition 6.1 describes the correspondence ϕ.
Proposition 6.1 Let x ∈ Rm and z ∈ ϕ(x). Then j(x) > 0 and 〈duj(x), z〉 + uj(x) =
μjb(x)/j(x) for each j ∈ N , where b(x) > 0 is a real number.
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Proof. Let
b(x) =
∑
k∈N
k(x)uk(x).
Now take zi ∈ ϕi(x) and let ti = du(x)zi for each i ∈ N . We shall write tij to denote
the component j of the vector ti. It is obvious from the deﬁnition of the correspondence
ϕi and the deﬁnition of the space T (x) that the point ti is a solution to the optimization
problem
maximize t¯ii subject to 〈(x), t¯i〉 = 0 and t¯ij + uj(x) ≥ 0 for each j ∈ N.
We must have i(x) > 0 for otherwise the problem of player i would have no solution. We
have
tij = −uj(x) for each (i, j) ∈ N ×N, i = j
tii = b(x)/i(x)− ui(x) for each i ∈ N.
By Proposition 4.4 we have 〈dui(x), zi〉 > −ui(x). Because tii = 〈dui(x), zi〉 it follows
immediately from the above equation that b(x) > 0.
A typical element of ϕ(x) is z =
∑
i∈N μizi with zi an element of ϕi(x). We have
〈duj(x), z〉 =
∑
i∈N μi〈duj(x), zi〉
=
∑
i∈N μitij
= μjb(x)/j(x)− μjuj(x)− (1− μj)uj(x)
= μjb(x)/j(x)− uj(x).
The result follows.
The proof of Theorem 4 is now immediate. Suppose that 0 ∈ ϕ(x). Letting z = 0 in
Proposition 6.1 shows that the condition 2 is satisﬁed.
7 Quadratic utilities
In this section we show the asymptotic uniqueness of bargaining equilibria when the utility
of each player is quadratic. To the best of my knowledge, it is the only result on the
asymptotic uniqueness of bargaining equilibria outside the extreme cases m = 1 and m =
n− 1. More precisely, we impose the following assumptions.
(Q1) The set N is a subset of Rm containing zero. Player 0 has positive recognition
probability. Furthermore, if 0 ≤ 〈i, z〉 for all i ∈ N , then z = 0.
(Q2) The utility function of player i is given by
ui(x) = 1− 〈x, x〉/2 + 〈i, x〉 = 1 + (‖i‖2 − ‖i− x‖2)/2.
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Thus the point i is the ideal point of player i and the upper counter sets of the function
ui are the balls centered at i. The gradient of the function ui is given by dui(x) = i − x.
Assumption (Q1) guarantees that z = 0 whenever 〈dui(x), z〉 = 0 for each i ∈ N , as is
required by Assumption (A4).
Theorem 5 Assume (Q1) and (Q2). Then the correspondence ϕ has a unique zero.
Consequently, bargaining equilibria are asymptotically unique.
We need the following deﬁnitions.
S(x) =
⋂
i∈N
{s ∈ Rm | 〈x− i, s〉 ≤ 1},
a(x) = 1 + 〈x, x〉/2 and j(x) = x/a(x).
B = {x ∈ Rm | 〈x, x〉 ≤ 2}.
Also deﬁne the correspondence φ : Rm ⇒ Rm by the following equations.
φ(x) = arg max
s∈S(x)
〈i− x, s〉 for each i ∈ N
φ(x) =
{∑
i∈S μiφi(x) if φi(x) =  for each i ∈ S
 otherwise.
The following proposition is implied directly by our deﬁnitions.
Proposition 7.1 Assume (Q1) and (Q2). Suppose 0 ∈ ϕ(x). Then (a) x ∈ B and (b)
j(x) ∈ φ(x).
Proof. If 0 ∈ ϕ(x), then 0 ∈ Z(x) and therefore ui(x) ≥ 0 for every i ∈ N . Since 0 ∈ N
by assumption (Q1), we have u0(x) = 1 − 〈x, x〉/2 ≥ 0, which proves part (a). To prove
part (b), we compute the set Z(x):
Z(x) = ∩{z ∈ Rm | 〈dui(x), z〉+ ui(x) ≥ 0}
= ∩{z ∈ Rm | 〈i− x, z〉 + 1− 〈x, x〉/2 + 〈i, x〉 ≥ 0}
= ∩{z ∈ Rm | 〈i− x, z + x〉+ 1 + 〈x, x〉/2 ≥ 0}
= ∩{z ∈ Rm | 〈x− i, z + x〉 ≤ a(x)}
= ∩{z ∈ Rm | z = a(x)s− x for some s ∈ S(x)}
= a(x)S(x)− {x}.
It follows that ϕ(x) = a(x)φ(x) − {x}. If 0 ∈ ϕ(x), then x ∈ a(x)φ(x), or equivalently
j(x) = x/a(x) ∈ φ(x).
We say that the correspondence γ : Rm ⇒ Rm is increasing on the set B if 〈x− x¯, s− s¯〉 >
0 for every s ∈ γ(x) and s¯ ∈ γ(x¯) and every pair of points x = x¯ in B. It is weakly in-
creasing if the inequality is weak. The correspondence γ is (weakly) decreasing if −γ is
(weakly) increasing. We prove Theorem 5 by showing that the correspondence φ is weakly
decreasing, while the function j is increasing on the set B.
First we establish the monotonicity of the function j.
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Proposition 7.2 The function j is increasing on the set B.
Proof. Take two distinct points x and x¯ in B. Suppose ﬁrst that ‖x‖ = ‖x¯‖. Then
a(x)a(x¯)〈x− x¯, j(x)− j(x¯)〉 = 〈x− x¯, a(x¯)x− a(x)x¯〉
= a(x¯)〈x, x〉+ a(x)〈x¯, x¯〉 − (a(x) + a(x¯))〈x, x¯〉
≥ a(x¯)‖x‖2 + a(x)‖x¯‖2 − (a(x) + a(x¯))‖x‖‖x¯‖
= a(x¯)‖x‖(‖x‖ − ‖x¯‖) + a(x)‖x¯‖(‖x¯‖ − ‖x‖)
= (‖x‖ − ‖x¯‖)(a(x¯)‖x‖ − a(x)‖x¯‖)
= (‖x‖ − ‖x¯‖)(‖x‖+ ‖x‖‖x¯‖2/2− ‖x¯‖ − ‖x¯‖‖x‖2/2)
= (‖x‖ − ‖x¯‖)(‖x‖ − ‖x¯‖+ ‖x‖‖x¯‖(‖x¯‖ − ‖x‖)/2)
= (‖x‖ − ‖x¯‖)2(1− ‖x‖‖x¯‖/2) > 0.
The ﬁrst inequality is implied by the Schwarz–Cauchy inequality |〈x, x¯〉| ≤ ‖x‖‖x¯‖. The
second inequality holds because ‖x‖ = ‖x¯‖ and ‖x‖ ≤ √2 and ‖x¯‖ ≤ √2, of which at least
one inequality is strict. Suppose now that ‖x‖ = ‖x¯‖. Then
a(x)a(x¯)〈x− x¯, j(x)− j(x¯)〉 = a(x)〈x− x¯, x− x¯〉 > 0.
We now turn to the properties of the set S(x) and the correspondence φ. Given two
points x and x¯ of Rm deﬁne the function h = h[x, x¯] : S(x) −→ Rm by the equation
h[x, x¯](s) =
s
1− 〈x− x¯, s〉 .
Proposition 7.3 Let x and x¯ be two points of Rm such that φ(x) =  and φ(x¯) = .
Then
(a) 〈x− x¯, s〉 < 1 for all s ∈ S(x) and 〈x¯− x, s¯〉 < 1 for all s¯ ∈ S(x¯).
(b) The map h[x, x¯] carries the set S(x) homeomorphically onto S(x¯) and h[x¯, x] is its
inverse.
Proof. (a) To prove the ﬁrst inequality suppose there exists a point s in S(x) such that
1 ≤ 〈x− x¯, s〉. We have 〈x− i, s〉 ≤ 1 for each i ∈ N . Suppose ﬁrst that 0 ≤ 〈x¯, s〉. Then
0 ≤ 〈x¯, s〉 ≤ 〈x, s〉 − 1 ≤ 〈i, s〉 for each i ∈ N and Assumption (Q1) implies that s = 0, a
contradiction. We conclude that 〈x¯, s〉 < 0. But now 〈x¯− i, s〉 = 〈x¯− x, s〉 + 〈x− i, s〉 ≤
−1 + 1 = 0. Therefore, the point ts is an element of the set S(x¯) for each t ≥ 0. But then
φ0(x¯) = , because −t〈x¯, s〉 converges to plus inﬁnity as t goes to inﬁnity. Since player 0
has positive recognition probability by Assumption (Q1), it follows that φ(x¯) =  contrary
to the assumption of the proposition. The second inequality follows by interchanging the
roles of x and x¯.
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(b) We only have to show that h[x, x¯] carries the set S(x) into the set S(x¯) and that
h[x¯, x] ◦ h[x, x¯] is the identity map on S(x). The result then follows since x and x¯ are
arbitrary. For simplicity we write h for h[x, x¯] and h¯ for h[x¯, x]. For s ∈ S(x) we have
〈x¯− i, h(s)〉 = 〈x¯− i, s〉
1− 〈x− x¯, s〉
=
〈x− i, s〉 − 〈x− x¯, s〉
1− 〈x− x¯, s〉 ≤
≤ 1− 〈x− x¯, s〉
1− 〈x− x¯, s〉 = 1.
Thus the point h(s) is an element of S(x¯). We conclude that the map h carries the set
S(x) into the set S(x¯). Letting c = 1− 〈x− x¯, s〉 we see that
(h¯ ◦ h)(s) = h¯(s/c) = s/c
1− 〈x¯− x, s/c〉 =
s
c− 〈x¯− x, s〉 = s.
We are now in a position to establish the monotonicity of the correspondence φ.
Proposition 7.4 The correspondence φ is weakly decreasing.
Proof. We show that each φi is a weakly decreasing correspondence on the set of points
x such that φ(x) = 0. Let x and x¯ be two points such that both φ(x) and φ(x¯) are non–
empty. As before, we write h for h[x, x¯] and h[x¯, x] for h¯. Let s ∈ φi(x) and s¯ ∈ φi(x¯).
Since the point s is a maximizer of the function 〈i− x, •〉 on the set S(x) and since h¯(s¯)
is one of its elements, we have the inequalities
〈i− x, h¯(s¯)〉 ≤ 〈i− x, s〉.
Since h¯ ◦ h is the identity map on the set S(x), we can write s = h¯(h(s)). Then the
inequality above becomes
〈i− x, s¯〉
1− 〈x¯− x, s¯〉 = 〈i− x, h¯(s¯)〉 ≤ 〈i− x, h¯(h(s))〉 =
〈i− x, h(s)〉
1− 〈x¯− x, h(s)〉 .
Adding 1 to the left and the right hand side of this inequality then yields
〈i− x¯, s¯〉
1− 〈x¯− x, s¯〉 ≤
〈i− x¯, h(s)〉
1− 〈x¯− x, h(s)〉 . (3)
Since s¯ is a maximizer of the function 〈i− x¯, •〉 on the set S(x¯) and since h(s) is one of its
elements, we have the inequality
〈i− x¯, s¯〉 ≥ 〈i− x¯, h(s)〉 (4)
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Notice that in (3) both denominators are positive by Proposition 7.3(a) and 〈i− x¯, s¯〉 > 0
because 0 is in the interior of S(x¯). Therefore comparing Inequalities (3) and (4) gives
1− 〈x¯− x, s¯〉 ≥ 1− 〈x¯− x, h(s)〉.
Rearranging we get
〈x− x¯, h(s)− s¯〉 ≤ 0.
Furthermore,
〈x− x¯, s− h(s)〉 = −〈x− x¯, s〉2/(1− 〈x− x¯, s〉) ≤ 0.
Finally,
〈x− x¯, s− s¯〉 = 〈x− x¯, s− h(s)〉+ 〈x− x¯, h(s)− s¯〉 ≤ 0.
This completes the proof.
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